We consider a strategic game, where players submit jobs to a machine that executes all jobs in a way that minimizes energy while respecting the given deadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player wants to minimize the sum of that charge and of their job's deadline multiplied by a priority weight. Two charging schemes are studied, the proportional cost share which does not always admit pure Nash equilibria, and the marginal cost share, which does always admit pure Nash equilibria, at the price of overcharging by a constant factor. keywords scheduling, energy management, quality of service, optimization, mechanism design.
Introduction
In many computing systems, maximizing quality of service comes generally at the price of a high energy consumption. This is also the case for the speed scaling scheduling model considered in this paper. It has been introduced in [11] , and triggered a lot of work on offline and online algorithms; see [1] for an overview.
The online and offline optimization problem for minimizing flow time while respecting a maximum energy consumption has been studied for the single machine setting in [16, 2, 5, 8] and for the parallel machines setting in [3] . For the variant where an aggregation of energy and flow time is considered, polynomial approximation algorithms have been presented in [7, 4, 13] .
In this paper we propose to study this problem from a different perspective, namely as a strategic game. In society many ecological problems are either addressed in a centralized manner, like forcing citizens to sort household waste, or in a decentralized manner, like tax incentives to enforce ecological behavior. This paper proposes incentives for a scheduling game, in form of an energy cost charging scheme.
Consider a scheduling problem for a single processor, that can run at variable speed, such as the modern microprocessors Intel SpeedStep, AMD PowerNow! or IBM EnergyScale. Higher speed means that jobs finish earlier at the price of a higher energy consumption. Each job has some workload, representing a number of instructions to execute, and a release time before which it cannot be scheduled. Every user submits a single job to a common processor, declaring the job parameters, together with a deadline, that the player chooses at his convenience.
The processor will schedule the submitted jobs preemptively, so that all release times and deadlines are respected and the overall energy usage is minimized. The energy consumed by the schedule needs to be charged to the users. The individual goal of each user is to minimize the sum of the energy cost share and of the requested weighted deadline. The weight is a private priority factor representing the individual importance of a small deadline. This factor includes implicitly a conversion factor that allows of aggregation of deadline and energy, in a single individual penalty.
In a companion paper [9] we study this game from the point of view of the game regulator, and compare different ways to organize the game which would lead to truthfulness. In this paper we focus on a particular game setting, described in the next section.
The model
Formally, we consider a non-cooperative game with n players and a regulator. The regulator manages the machine where the jobs are executed. Each player has a job i with a workload w i , a release time r i and a priority p i , representing a quality of service coefficient. The player submits its job together with a deadline d i > r i to the regulator. Workloads, release times and deadlines are public information known to all players, while quality of service coefficients can be private.
The regulator implements some cost sharing mechanism, which is known to all users. This mechanism defines a cost share function b i specifying how much player i is charged. The penalty of player i is the sum of two values: his energy cost share b i (w, r, d) defined by the mechanism, where w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ), r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ), d = (d 1 , . . . , d n ) are the input values, and his waiting cost, which can be either p i d i or p i (d i − r i ); we use the former waiting cost throughout the article but all our results apply to both settings. The sum of all player's penalties, i.e., energy cost shares and waiting costs will be called the utilitarian social cost.
The regulator computes a minimum energy schedule for a single machine in the speed scaling model. In this model at any point in time t the processor can run at some speed s(t) ≥ 0. As a result for any time interval I, the workload executed in I is t∈I s(t)dt at the price of an energy consumption valuated at t∈I s(t) α dt for some fixed physical constant α ∈ [2, 3] which is device dependent [6] .
The sum of the energy used by this optimum schedule and of all the players' waiting costs will be called the effective social cost.
The minimum energy schedule can be computed in time O(n 2 log n) [12] and has (among others) the following properties [17] . The jobs in the schedule are executed by preemptive earliest deadline first order (EDF), and the speed s(t) at which they are processed is piecewise constant. Preemptive EDF means that at every time point among all jobs which are already released and not yet completed, the job with the smallest deadline is executed, using job indexes to break ties.
The cost sharing mechanism defines the game completely. Ideally, we would like the game and the mechanism to have the following properties.
existence of pure Nash equilibria This means that there is always a strategy profile vector d such that no player can unilaterally deviate from his strategy d i while strictly decreasing his penalty.
budget balance The mechanism is c-budged balanced, when the sum of the cost shares is no smaller than the total energy consumption and no larger than c times the energy consumption. Ideally we would like c to be close to 1.
In the sequel we introduce and study two different cost sharing mechanisms, namely Proportional Cost Sharing where every player pays exactly the cost generated during the execution of his job, and Marginal Cost Sharing where every player pays the increase of energy cost generated by adding this player to the game.
Proportional cost sharing
The proportional cost sharing is the simplest budget balanced cost sharing scheme one can think of. Every player i is charged exactly the energy consumed during the execution of his job. Unfortunately this mechanism does not behave well as we show in Theorem 1.
Fact 1.
In a single player game, the player's penalty is minimized by the deadline
Proof. If player 1 chooses deadline d 1 = r 1 + x then the schedule is active between time r 1 and r 1 + x at speed w 1 /x. Therefore his penalty is
Deriving this expression in x, and using the fact that the penalty is concave in t for any x > 0 and α > 0, we have that the optimal x for the player will set to zero the derivative. This implies the claimed deadline.
If there are at least two players however, the game does not have nice properties as we show now. Theorem 1. The Proportional Cost Sharing does not always admit a pure Nash equilibrium.
The proof consists of a very simple example consisting of 2 identical players with identical jobs, say w 1 = w 2 = 1, r 1 = r 2 = 0 and p 1 = p 2 = 1. First we determine the best response of player 1 as a function of player 2, then we conclude that there is no pure Nash equilibrium. Lemma 1. Given the second player's choice d 2 , the penalty of the first player as a function of his choice d 1 is given by 
1 . The value at such local minimum is again a function of α and d 2 , which we denote by g i (d 2 ). These are only potential minima: they exist if and only if the condition given in the last column is satisfied.
The local minima of f (d 1 ) are summarized in Table 1 , and the penalties corresponding to player 1 picking these minima are illustrated in Figure 1 . Proof. Formula (1) follows by a straightforward case inspection. Then, to find all the local minima of f , we first look at the behavior of each of f i , finding their local minima in their respective intervals, and afterwards we inspect the border points of these intervals.
Range of f 1 : The derivative of f 1 is
, whose derivative in turn is positive for α > 1. Therefore, f 1 has a local minimum at d
(1
1 as specified. Since we require that this local minimum is within the range where f coincides with f 1 , the necessary and sufficient condition is d
Range of f 2 : f 2 is an increasing function, and therefore it attains a minimum value only at the lower end of its range, d
1 . However, if d
1 is to be a local minimum of f , there can be no local minimum of f in the range of f 1 (immediately to the left), so the applicable range of d (2) 1 is the complement of that of d (1) 1 .
Range of f 3 : The derivative of f 3 is
whose derivative in turn is positive for α > 1. Hence, f 3 has a local minimum at d
as specified. The existence of this local minimum requires
whose derivative in turn is positive for α > 1. Hence, f 4 has a local minimum at d
1 as specified. The existence of this local minimum requires d
Now let us consider the border points of the ranges of each f i . Since f 2 is strictly increasing, the border point of the ranges of f 2 and f 3 is not a local minimum of f . This leaves only the border point d 1 is a local minimum of f if and only if f 3 (d
1 is not a local minimum of f either.
Note that the range of g 1 is disjoint with the ranges of g 3 and g 4 , and with the exception of the shared border value 2(α − 1) 1/α , also with the range of g 2 . However, the ranges of g 2 , g 3 and g 4 are not disjoint. Therefore, we now focus on their shared range, and determine which of the functions gives rise to the true local minimum.
is an increasing linear function, and the function
1 . Moreover, there exist two unique values
Proof. It follows from their definitions in Table 1 
, it suffices to show the following
We start with the left inequality:
For the right inequality, we first note that
We claim that for α ≥ 2 we have
Since we have equality at α = 2, it suffices to prove that the left hand side is increasing. To this end, we consider its derivative
and note that its enumerator is increasing with α and equals 0 for α = 1. Thus (6) holds.
This permits us to define
and to upper bound
In order to lower bound
for α ≥ 2, it suffices to show that z is increasing with α, since the right hand side is decreasing with α. Its derivative is
Observe that α ln(2− √ 2) < −1 for every α ≥ 2, and therefore z is positive and z is increasing as required. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
With Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, whose statements are summarized in Table 1 and Figure 1 , we can finally determine what is the best response of the first player as a function of d 2 .
Lemma 3. The best response for player 1 as function of d 2 is
Proof. The proof consists in determining which of the applicable local minima of f is the global minimum for each range of d 2 . Again, the cases are depicted in Figure 1 .
In this case, we claim that the best response of player 1 is
First we prove that
The upper bound hold since
The lower bound holds since,
holds for α ≥ 2. In fact, both inequalities are true even for α > 1, but as we require α ≥ 2 in the proof of Lemma 2, we aim for a simple proof.
These bounds imply that in case (i) player 1 chooses the minimum among the 3 local minima d
1 , and d
1 , where the middle one is only an option for
It follows from Lemma 2 that the last option always dominates: by (5), for every
, and by (4), for every
. This concludes the analysis for case (i).
First we observe that by Lemma 2 equation (5) we have
which rules out d
1 as a choice for player 1, leaving only d
, and by (4), we have
Note that for α = 2, the range of this case is empty. 
For this range, the only viable choice for player 1 is
which is therefore his best response.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
By the symmetry of the players, the second player's best response is in fact an identical function of d 1 as the one stated in Lemma 3. By straightforward inspection it follows that there is no fix point (d 1 , d 2 ) to this game, which implies the following theorem, see Figure 2 for illustration.
Marginal cost sharing
In this section we propose a different cost sharing scheme, that improves on the previous one in the sense that it admits pure Nash equilibria, however for the price of overcharging by at most a constant factor.
Before we give the formal definition we need to introduce some notations. Let OPT(d) be the energy minimizing schedule for the given instance, and OPT(d −i ) be the energy minimizing schedule for the instance where job i is removed. We denote by E(S) the energy cost of schedule S.
In the marginal cost sharing scheme, player i pays the penalty function
This scheme defines an exact potential game by construction [14] . Formally, let n be the number of players, D = {d|∀j : d j > r j } be the set of action profiles (deadlines) over the action sets D i of each player. Let us denote the effective social cost corresponding to a strategy profile d by Φ(d). Then
Clearly, if a player i changes its strategy d i and his penalty decreases by some amount ∆, then the effective social cost decreases by the same amount ∆, because E(OPT(d −i )) remains unchanged.
Existence of Equilibria
While the best response function is not continuous in the strategy profile, precluding the use of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem, existence of pure Nash equilibria can nevertheless be easily established.
To this end, note that the global minimum of the effective social cost, if it exists, is a pure Nash equilibrium. Its existence follows from (1) compactness of a non-empty sub-space of strategies with bounded social cost and (2) continuity of Φ.
For ( 
Convergence can take forever
In this game the strategy set is infinite. Moreover, the convergence time can be infinite as we demonstrate below in Theorem 2. Note that this also proves that in general there are no dominant strategies in this game.
Theorem 2. For the game with the marginal cost sharing mechanism, the convergence time to reach a pure Nash equilibrium can be unbounded.
Proof. The proof is by exhibiting again the same small example, with 2 players, release times 0, unit weights, unit penalty factors, and α > 2. From the previous section, we know that the fame admits a pure Nash equilibrium, and by symmetry of the players, in fact two pure Nash equilibria. Following [9] , the first one is
while the second one is symmetric for players 1 and 2.
In the reminder of the proof, we assume that player 1 chooses a deadline which is close to the pure Nash equilibrium above. By analyzing the best responses of the players, we conclude that after a best response of player 2, and then of player 1 again, he chooses a deadline which is even closer to the pure Nash equilibrium above but still different from it, leading to an infinite convergence sequence of best responses. Now suppose d 1 = δ α−1 2 1/α for some 1 < δ < 2 1/α . What is the best response for player 2?
Lemma 4. Given the first player's choice d 1 , the penalty of the second player as a function of his choice d 2 is given by
and the best response for player 2 as function of d 1 is
Proof. We first analyze the behavior of each of h i , finding their local minima in their respective intervals, and afterwards we show the dominance of (7). For convenience we omit parameter d 1 in each function h i . Figure 3 illustrate the best response for player 2 when player 1 chooses
2 ) 1/α δ for some δ > 1.
Range of h 4 :
The derivative of h 4 in d 2 is
which is zero exactly for the value
As the second derivative
, which holds by assumption δ < 2 1/α . In that case the penalty would be
By comparing (8) with the remaining case, we show that it is indeed the best choice for player 2.
which is zero for d 2 = 2(α − 1) 1/α and negative for d 2 < 2(α − 1) 1/α . As
the minimum penalty in this range is attained at the right boundary of the interval, i.e., for d 2 = 2d 1 = 2δ α−1 2 1/α . But at this point the function h, which is continuous, coincides with h 4 , which is decreasing in 2d 1 , d 1 + (α − 1) 1/α . Hence 2d 1 is not a local minimum of h.
Range of h 2 : h 2 is an increasing function, and therefore it attains a minimum value only at the lower end of its range, which is d 1 /2 in this case. Clearly, d 1 /2 is a local minimum of h if and only if
is not a local minimum of h either.
Range of h 1 : We will show that h 1 is strictly larger than (8).
To lower bound h 1 we use the strict convexity of the function x → x 1−α , which implies
Combining these, we can finally strictly lower bound the difference h 1 -(8) by
which is non-negative since 2 α ≥ 2α whenever α ≥ 2.
From now on we assume that player 2 chooses (d 1 , d 2 ) and the best response for player 1 is
Proof. Again player 1 best response is analyzed through a case analysis, similar to the previous one. Figure 4 illustrate the best response for player 1 when he chooses d 2 = (α − 1) 1/α (1 + 2 −1/α δ) for some δ > 1. As in the previous proof, for convenience we omit parameter d 2 in each function h i .
Range of h 1 : The first derivative of h 1 in d 1 is
And the second derivative is
which is positive, implying that the penalty is convex in d 1 .
Now, we show that we have a local minimum for some 1 < δ < δ at some value For this purpose we analyze the interval
First we evaluate h 1 at the lower end
This means that
which is negative for δ > 1 and α > 1.
Secondly, we evaluate the h 1 at the upper end
which is positive by δ < 2 1/α and α > 1. Together with the continuity of the penalty function, it implies that there is a value 1 < δ < δ such that
is a local minimum.
To conclude we compare this local minimum with the remaining cases, showing the dominance of this value.
Range of h 2 : h 2 is an increasing function and therefore is minimum at
Range of h 3 : In this case, the derivative of the penalty function is
which is zero at
Note that the second derivative
is positive, so the penalty is convex, and (10) is a local minimum. It is greater than d 2 by δ < 2 1/α and smaller than 2d 2 by δ > 0. Therefore the local minimum belongs to the range considered in this case.
The penalty at
We claim that this penalty is larger than h 1 evaluated at (9), eliminating 2(α − 1) 1/α for a best response. For this purpose we need to show
This holds because
for any α > 1 because 2 1/α α increases with α > ln 2 and equals 2 when α = 1.
which is a contradiction by δ2 −1/α > 0
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
Bounding total charge
In this section we bound the total cost share for the Marginal Cost Sharing Scheme, by showing that it is at least E(OPT(d)) and at most α times this value. In fact we show a stronger claim for individual cost shares.
Theorem 3. For every player i, its marginal costshare is at least its proportional costshare and at most α times the proportional costshare.
Proof. Fix a player i, and denote by S −i the schedule obtained from OPT(d) when all executions of i are replaced by idle times. Clearly we have the following inequalities.
Then the marginal cost share of player i can be lower bounded by
According to [17] the schedule OPT can be obtained by the following iterative procedure. Let P be the support of a partial schedule. For every interval [t, t ) we define its domain I t,t := [t, t )\P , the set of included jobs J t,t := {j : [r j , d j ) ⊆ [t, t )}, and the density σ t,t := j∈J t,t w j /|I t,t |. The procedure starts with P = ∅, and while not all jobs are scheduled, selects an interval [t, t ) with maximal density, and schedules all jobs from J t,t in earliest deadline order in I t,t at speed σ t,t , then adds I t,t to P .
For the upper bound, let t 1 < t 2 < . . . < t be the sequence of all release times and deadlines for some ≤ 2n. Let be the schedules S = OPT(d), S = OPT(d −i ). Clearly both schedules run at uniform speed in every interval [t k−1 , t k ). For every 1 ≤ k ≤ n let s k be the speed of S in [t k−1 , t k ), and s k the speed of S in the same interval. From the iterative procedure described above it follows that every job is scheduled at constant speed. Let s 0 be the speed at which job i is scheduled in S. It also follows that if
We establish the following upper bound.
The first inequality uses the generalized Bernoulli inequality, and the last one the fact that for all k with s k = s k we have s k ≤ s a .
The theorem follows from the fact that s α−1 a w i is precisely the proportional cost share of job i in OPT(d).
A tight example is given by n jobs, each with workload 1/n, release time 0 and deadline 1. Clearly the optimal energy consumption is 1 for this instance. The marginal cost share for each player is 1 − (1 − 1/n) α . Finally we observe that the total marginal cost share tends to α, i.e. lim
5 Final remarks
Cross-monotonicity
The cross-monotonicity is a property of cost sharing games, stating that whenever new players enter the game, the cost share of any fixed player does not increase. This property is useful for stability in the game, and is the key to the Moulin carving algorithm [15] , which selects a set of players to be served for specific games.
In the game that we consider, the minimum energy of an optimal schedule for a set S of jobs contrasts with many studied games, where serving more players becomes more cost effective, because the used equipment is better used.
Consider a very simple example of two identical players, submitting their respective jobs with the same deadline 1. Suppose the workload of each job is w, then the minimum energy necessary to schedule one job is w α , while the cost to serve both jobs is (2w) α , meaning that the cost share increase whenever a second player enters the game. Therefore the marginal cost sharing scheme is not cross-monotonic.
Uniqueness of Nash equilibria
In this paper we showed that the deadline game with the marginal cost sharing mechanism always admits a pure Nash equilibrium. However the Nash equilibrium may not be unique. Here, a simple example is an instance with n identical players where n! Nash symmetric equilibria are admitted. For arbitrary instances, the uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium raises two questions. The first question concerns the comparison of different Nash equilibria in terms of social cost. If the divergence is important, then it means that the outcome of the game can be arbitrary, and may indicate the need for another mechanism, which smooths the possible resulting Nash equilibria. The second question concerns the characterization of job sets which lead to a unique Nash equilibrium.
We are interested in this last question, already in the 2 player setting. Here we fixed normalized quantities p 1 = 1, w 1 = 1 for the first player, and leave the quantities of the second player variable. Which points (p 2 , w 2 ) do admit a unique Nash equilibrium?
The 2 potential Nash equilibria are the following strategy profiles 
To break the symmetry we consider only points where the social cost of S21 is minimal among the two profiles. In [9] we showed that these are precisely the points that satisfy For such points, we ask whether one of the players wants to deviate from S12, i.e., the other potential equilibrium, with larger social cost. Our experiments indicate that, for each player j ∈ {1, 2}, there is a threshold t j , which depends on p 2 , such that player j wants to deviate if and only if w 2 ≤ t j . Figure 5 depicts the plots of these threshold functions, determined numerically. We were unable to rigorously prove their existence, obtain their closed forms, or related them to functions studied in [10] . However by choosing α = 2, p 1 = w 1 = 1 and (p 2 , w 2 ) inside the shaded region of Figure 5 , one can easily verify that S21 is a unique pure Nash equilibrium.
